MULTI-SPECIES INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS: THE SCOTIA-FUNDY MOBILE GEAR GROUNDFISHERY by Dupont, Diane P. & Grafton, R. Quentin
205
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 15, pp. 205–220 0738-1360/00 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved Copyright © 2001 Marine Resources Foundation
Perspectives
Multi-Species Individual Transferable Quotas:





Abstract  Few studies examine the economic effects of individual harvesting
rights in multi-species fisheries. Using costs and earnings data from a multi-
species individual transferable quota (ITQ) fishery in Nova Scotia, before and
after the introduction of harvesting rights, the effects on inputs, outputs, prices,
and vessel exit are examined. The results provide insights about the manage-
ment of multi-species ITQs.
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Introduction
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are used in many fisheries and several differ-
ent countries (Grafton, Squires, and Kirkley 1996). Of those ITQ programs currently
in place, most have been established for single-species fisheries, where fishers pri-
marily target a particular species. Some countries also use ITQs in a few multi-spe-
cies fisheries, where a number of species may be targeted simultaneously. Unfortu-
nately, many of the potential problems associated with so-called single-species ITQs
are likely to be exacerbated in multi-species fisheries (Copes 1986). These problems
include bycatch concerns, discarding, reconciliation of catches with quota holdings,
and the setting of quotas that allow for flexibility in harvesting while ensuring the
sustainability of different stocks (Squires et al. 1998).1
Many assessments of ITQs exist, including several books.2 Despite the potential
importance of ITQs in multi-species fisheries, few studies exist that examine the
economic effects of transferable harvesting rights in such fisheries. Using individual
vessel data from a multi-species fishery, Nova Scotia’s ITQ program for mobile gear
groundfish vessels 35-65 feet in length, the paper presents a review of the economic
consequences of the introduction of private harvesting rights from the perspective of
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input use, output mix, and output prices. Insights from the study are used to provide
suggestions regarding how to improve the management of multi-species ITQ fisher-
ies.
Evaluation of Individual Transferable Quota Programs
Individual harvesting rights can potentially address a number of problems in fisher-
ies. First, under limited-entry regulations, controls on the inputs may prevent fishers
from optimizing their mix of inputs to minimize costs for a given level of output.3
For example, restrictions on vessel size or gear may encourage fishers to substitute
and use a greater amount of labor than is economically optimal. Second, limits on
season length under limited-entry regulations may prevent fishers from achieving
their desired scale of production, such that the capital employed on vessels is used at
less-than-full capacity. Limits on season length imposed to conserve particular fish
stocks may also prevent fishers from optimizing as to when and where they fish,
such that their catch and mix of species provides less than the maximum possible
return. Third, a move away from input controls to output controls may give fishers
both the time and the incentive to improve the quality and increase the value of the
landed product and avoid the “race to fish.” For instance, with a longer fishing sea-
son and a fixed catch determined by individual output controls, the incentive is to
maximize net returns per quota unit by landing higher-quality and higher-priced
fish. Fourth, ITQs can provide fishers with a long-term interest in the resource that
can improve overall management by giving them a greater incentive to be more ac-
tively involved in decision-making. Finally, transferability of the harvesting rights
allows fishers with higher returns per unit of fish to increase their share of the har-
vest and, thus, should increase the rents from fishing.
Using data from the Scotia-Fundy fishery, some of the potential outcomes asso-
ciated with a change from limited-entry regulations to ITQs can be explored. In par-
ticular, the study examines the impact on input use, outputs, and price changes in the
fishery.
Multi-Species ITQ Scotia-Fundy Inshore Mobile Gear Groundfishery
To better understand the consequences of multi-species ITQs, their deficiencies, and
how they may be improved, the paper reviews the Nova Scotia mobile gear multi-
species fishery over a period that encompasses both pre- and post-rights-based man-
agement.
History of the Pre-ITQ Fishery
An important component of the groundfish fishery in the Scotia-Fundy region is the
“nearshore” mobile gear fleet.4,5 The fleet consists of vessels ranging from 35 to 65
feet in length that use otter trawls or Danish seines to fish cod, haddock, pollock,
various flatfish, and some redfish. Only vessels in the required 35–65 foot range that
3 For a detailed discussion of the effects of limited-entry on fisheries, see Townsend (1990).
4 See Crowley and Palsson (1992) for a description of Canadian fisheries and Grafton (1996) for a re-
view of rights-based fisheries in Atlantic Canada.
5 Other groundfish fleets in the same area are the fixed gear (under 65 feet) fleet, the Eastern Nova
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use trawls are permitted to participate in the fishery, where controls on vessel length
are part of a broad set of licensing regulations applied throughout groundfish fisher-
ies in Atlantic Canada. For many decades, groundfish (particularly cod) have been
heavily exploited in this sector and typically made up 30–40% of the total landed
value of fish in the region (DFO Web Statistics, various years).
From the 1970s onward the fishery has been regulated by a total allowable catch
(TAC) that has limited the total catch for the fleet. During the 1970s and 1980s,
fishing power and capacity grew in this fishery, in spite of limited entry regulations
and input restrictions.6 In particular, adoption of the 200-mile limit in 1977 encour-
aged the purchase of bigger and more powerful vessels during the period 1978–82.
For instance, in a study conducted in 1986, researchers found that the inshore mo-
bile gear fleet was four times bigger than the size required to harvest the TAC, set at
the F0.1 level (Barbara, Brander, and Liew 1995). This was in spite of regulations de-
signed to limit effort in the fishery. Fleet capacity further increased in the period
1986–87 in response to very high prices for Canadian groundfish in Boston.
By the late 1980s, managers were concerned about two things. It had become
clear that the set of traditional management tools (including length restrictions, gear
restrictions, limited entry restrictions, and fishing ground closures) employed had
not prevented overcapacity in the fleet. In addition, the status of groundfish stocks
off the Nova Scotia coast was showing evidence of severe declines in biomass (DFO
1995). The Canadian Stock Assessment Secretariat Science Sector (1998) advanced
a number of causes as contributing to these declines. These factors included: high
quotas and over-optimistic assessments, high effort and wasteful fishing practices,
inadequate enforcement, harsh environmental conditions, and seal predation. Fig-
ures 1 through 3 show landings and spawning biomass estimates for cod, haddock,
and pollock—the main species for this fishery—for various fishing regions in the
Scotia-Fundy area for the past two decades. For cod and haddock, in particular, the
biomass fell sharply in the late 1980s with a concomitant decline in harvests.
Due to concerns about the decline in the stocks, in 1989 the Scotia-Fundy in-
shore mobile gear fishery was closed midyear and did not reopen until 1990. As a
result, a task force was established to look into the overcapacity and low stock prob-
lems. It recommended the creation of an ITQ program for the fleet, which was sub-
sequently introduced in January 1991.
The Multi-Species ITQ Fishery
Under the ITQ program, each license holder was given an individual quota alloca-
tion calculated on the basis of the average of the best two catch years during the
1986–89 fishing seasons (Barbara, Brander, and Liew 1995). Initially, only some stocks
were subject to the ITQ program, namely 4TVn J-A cod, 4Vn M-D cod, 4VsW cod, 4X/
5Y cod, 4TVW haddock, 4X haddock, and 4VWX and 5 pollock. In 1992, George’s
Bank (5Z) cod and haddock were added and, in 1994, flounder was included in the list
of ITQ-based species. Each ITQ gave the holder a specific share of the total inshore
mobile gear quota for each particular stock subject to this form of management.
Not all license holders eligible to fish under the ITQ system, however, initially
took advantage of its provisions. Only 325 of the original 455 mobile gear license
holders chose to participate in the ITQ fishery in 1991. Of the remainder, the dispo-
sition was as follows: 74 dual fixed/mobile gear license holders chose to opt out of
the mobile gear ITQ fishery indefinitely and to remain in the non-quota, competitive
6 Dupont (1996) reviews the history of license limitation in Canada; in particular, Atlantic Canada.Dupont and Grafton 208
Figure 1. Cod Biomass and Landings (4VWX5Z)
Figure 2. Haddock Biomass and Landings (4TVWX5Z)Multi-species Fisheries and ITQs 209
fixed gear groundfish fishery; 6 licenses were cancelled entirely; and the remaining
50 license holders chose to participate in a “generalist,” non-ITQ fishing pool using
mobile gear. These 50 licensees pooled their individual allocations and agreed to
fish their overall quota competitively.7 Thus, in 1991, a total of 375 possible vessels
could pursue groundfish in the region using mobile gear. Of this number, 325 pur-
sued their own ITQs, while 50 fished a combined competitive fishing quota.
At the outset, the program allowed trading of quota amongst eligible quota
holders, permitting fishers to acquire quota up to 30 days after landing the catch.
Eligible quota holders included the 325 actual quota holders who chose to partici-
pate in the 1991 fishery, the 74 dual fixed/mobile gear fishers, and the 50 general-
ists. This made a total of 449 potential quota holders, which had fallen to 438 by
1998 (Liew 1999). Transfers of quota could be made between actual quota holders
in the fishery, in which case only the ownership of the quota changed, not the vessel
license. In addition, potential quota holders could purchase the quota license from
an existing participant in the fishery, but only one license per vessel was permitted.
An overall limit was also placed on the ownership of quota by one quota-holder
equal to 2% of the TAC.
Initially, approval for transfers was granted by DFO only after the owner made a
formal request to transfer an allocation, and the regulator verified that the owner had
sufficient quota remaining as eligible for a transfer. A simplified transfer process
was introduced on a trial basis in 1998 for four companies, and it appears to have
halved the number of transfers that need to be processed by DFO, with a concomi-
tant reduction in the administrative costs of the program. Recent changes in the pro-
gram also allow individuals and companies to own more than one mobile-gear li-
cense, should they wish, to pool their quota allocations across their vessel licenses.
Figure 3. Pollock Biomass and Landings (4VWX5Z)
7 This portion of the fleet was allowed to fish competitively for the so-called Generalist quota. Thus, the
quota system as a whole entailed individual quotas for each of the 325 ITQ participants and an overall
generalist quota for the 50 generalist vessels. The latter were not allocated a fixed quota, but could catch
an aggregate amount of fish up to the specified overall generalist quota limit.Dupont and Grafton 210
This has been facilitated by the increasing reliance upon the use of temporary quota
transfers (quota purchased only for a specific year), as opposed to permanent quota
transfers (outright purchase of quota holdings) (Liew 1999).
With the introduction of ITQs, fishers were subject to 100% dockside monitor-
ing by a private company and occasional at-sea surveillance. Since 1992, fishers
themselves have paid for the costs of monitoring and the use of at-sea observers.
Changes have also taken place with respect to the landing of fish without quota. Ini-
tially, fishers had up to 30 days from the time the fish were caught to purchase a
temporary quota. If the quota and catch were not reconciled within the 30-day pe-
riod, fishers were subject to an escalating penalty (which depended on the size of
the overcatch and other factors) but also reduced a fisher’s ITQ for the following
year. Starting in 1999, the penalty rates for failing to reconcile quotas remain the
same, but fishers now have a longer time in which to purchase temporary quotas.
Economic Impact of Multi-Species ITQs
To examine the impact of the adoption of ITQs at the level of the individual fisher,
we analyze vessel-specific data from two fishing years. The first is 1988, three years
prior to the adoption of quotas—and the second is 1991—the first year in which the
ITQ program was in place. Neither period is necessarily a “typical” fishing year but
are two periods for which data were available. The first data point in 1988 provides
observations of fishers prior to the collapse of the fish stocks in the early 1990s, and
the second data point is the only period when data is available following the intro-
duction of ITQs.
Data used in the analysis of the fishery include gear ownership and vessel char-
acteristic information obtained from the Vessel Performance Questionnaire instituted
by DFO. These are combined with yearly cost and earnings information in which the
coverage of vessels in the detailed vessel-level data set varies by year. For 1988, the cost
and earnings data includes 63 individual vessel responses that represent about 14% of
the entire licensed fleet at that time. For 1991, the data includes 84 individual vessel
responses, or some 26% of the total number of active vessels in the fishery for that
year. As further data from the fishery becomes available, more detailed and econo-
metric analysis of the changes brought about by ITQs will be undertaken.
Both data sets are from the DFO Program Coordination and Economics Branch,
Scotia-Fundy Region. Together, these data present a “snapshot” of both fishing in-
puts and the resulting catches for 1988 and 1991. In addition to vessel-specific data,
port-specific fuel prices (deflated by the GDP deflator) obtained from the Nova
Scotia Utility and Review Board, and aggregate catch and value of catch data for the
region from 1981 to 1995, are used to examine changes in the fishery following the
introduction of ITQs.
Input Changes
Changes in input use may be expected with ITQs if the input controls that previ-
ously existed, such as a limited fishing season, are removed or mitigated. To exam-
ine the response to the adoption of ITQs, the mean values (and their standard devia-
tions) for several key inputs for 1988 and 1991 are presented in table 1. The key inputs
are for fixed or semi-fixed inputs: gross registered tonnage, overall length, brake horse-
power, hold capacity, and variable inputs: the number of fishing days, quantity of fuel
used, number of days at sea, crew-days, and crew-size. The mean values are calculated
for two vessel sizes: small and large. The two vessel sizes reflect DFO licensingMulti-species Fisheries and ITQs 211
policy and vessel replacement barriers, where “small” vessels are under 45 feet in
length, while “large” vessels are greater than 45 feet, but under 65 feet long.
Table 1 indicates that there were no statistically significant changes in fixed or
input usage, on average, for either large or small vessels during the post-ITQ year
relative to the pre-ITQ period.8 This may be expected, given that changes in fixed or
semi-fixed inputs require an adjustment period of up to several years. Interestingly,
no significant change in the variable inputs of fishers was recorded over the 1998–
91 period.
Table 1 also reports on the standard deviations from the mean of the various in-
puts. There is an interesting difference in the results between large and small ves-
sels. The variability in large vessels decreased for all inputs, implying a greater de-
gree of homogeneity amongst these vessels following the introduction of ITQs. The
opposite appears to be true for small vessels for many of the inputs including: gross
registered tonnage, length, crew-size, crew-days, days at sea, and days fished. In
particular, variability of the days fished increased significantly over the period
1988–91. This may be because some vessels adjusted to a longer fishing season fol-
lowing the change in the management regime, while others did not.9 For the small
vessels, only horsepower and, in particular, fuel use, show reduced variability be-
tween 1988 and 1991.
Table 1
Mean Inputs for the Scotia-Fundy Groundfishery
Input Vessels Less Than 45’ Vessels Between 45–65’
1988 1991 1988 1991
GRT 32.53 31.75 71.85 73.86
(tons) (8.9) (10.09) (24.99) (21.48)
Horsepower 246.40 258.65 439.55 448.69
(brake horsepower) (82.03) (77.40) (167.74) (142.77)
Length overall 42.91 42.75 58.65 59.47
(feet) (1.62) (1.77) (6.98) (6.17)
Crewsize 2.05 1.93 2.81 2.62
(number) (0.67) (0.72) (1.14) (1.06)
Fuel 27,729.00 23,598.60 56,897.49 52,476.94
(liters) (19,788.16) (13,464.05) (27,220.72) (24,767.06)
Days fished 87.20 84.97 103.05 95.25
(number) (31.23) (38.71) (43.39) (38.81)
Days at sea 96.97 96.14 118.05 108.94
(days) (32.84) (36.53) (44.36) (37.29)
Crewdays 200.32 185.76 347.23 294.38
(number) (92.41) (104.19) (235.77) (194.85)
Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations for the variables.
8 A series of two-tailed independent samples t-tests are performed to examine whether the mean values
for the two years are equal. The sampling t-statistic is calculated by finding the difference between the
means of the two years and dividing the result by the pooled estimate of the population standard devia-
tion. This is a weighted mean of the individual year estimated standard deviations. Degrees of freedom
are equal to 145—the combined number of observations (147) minus the number of samples (2).
9 The Levene test verifies whether variability across years was constant by computing the absolute dif-
ference of each observation in a given year from its mean and then performing a one-way ANOVA on
the differences. This is an F test with 1 and 145 degrees of freedom.Dupont and Grafton 212
Although economic theory suggests that ITQs are likely to lead to a reduction in
some inputs as vessel owners alter their input mix to minimize harvesting costs, this
process is likely to involve an adjustment period. Thus, the lack of change in input use
in the Nova Scotia mobile gear fishery in 1991 may be explained by the fact that fishers
may not have had sufficient time to adjust their fishing operations to the new manage-
ment regime. Such an outcome has already been found in the British Columbia hali-
but fishery, where few changes in efficiency occurred in the first year that individual
harvesting rights were introduced into the fishery (Grafton, Squires, and Fox 2000).
While vessel-level data have not been collected since 1991, aggregate-level data
on the fishery is available. Using these data, DFO employees confirm that the length
of the fishing season in the Scotia-Fundy mobile gear fishery has increased in the
past few years under the ITQ management program.10 In particular, fishers are now
paying more attention to poor weather conditions and choosing not to go out fishing
when they are unfavorable. In addition, some fishers have concentrated more upon
the targeting of their catches for specific markets and prices.
Output Changes
There are two important questions with respect to the impact of ITQs. One, to what
extent do fishers shift their output mix in response to binding individual quotas in
multi-species fisheries? Two, do ITQs encourage fishers to improve quality or
change the product form so as to land a higher-valued product?
Table 2 presents the mean catch values for various species. It provides some
evidence of an output mix response due to the introduction of selective ITQs in a
multi-species fishery although, in part, the decline may reflect declines in biomass
over the period 1988 to 1991. The data indicate that the mean catch for all three
quota species (cod, haddock, and pollock) fell in 1991 for both vessel size classes,
with the exception of large vessels, which caught more pollock, on average, in 1991
than previously. Moreover, a number of these changes in the means are statistically
significant. Most notably, small vessels caught significantly less haddock and pol-
lock, on average, in 1991, while large vessels caught significantly less haddock, on
average. By contrast, small vessels switched to catching flounder, a species that sub-
sequently became subject to its own quota in 1994. In terms of variability in the
mean values, the mean catches of all ITQ species (with the exception of cod for
large vessels) were smaller. At the same time, small vessels increased their (non-
ITQ) redfish catches significantly in 1991, compared to 1988.
Price Changes
Table 3 gives the mean price (in 1991 dollars) for cod, haddock, pollock, and floun-
der. The table indicates that the prices of 1991 ITQ species (cod, haddock, and pol-
lock) are significantly higher compared to 1988. The mean real price for flounder
caught by small vessels fell over the period, but it rose for flounder caught by large
vessels. A significant difference in prices between 1988 through 1991 does not,
however, imply that ITQs brought about price changes, as market conditions varied
over the two periods.
To assess the effect of ITQs on prices, supplemental price data for the period
10 Personal communications from Doreen Liew and Cindy Webster, Department of Fisheries and Oceans,
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1981–95 is used to examine whether ITQs contributed to increased prices by encour-
aging fishers to land higher-quality fish.11 Such increases in output prices have oc-
curred in other ITQ fisheries, arising from a lengthened fishing season and the de-
sire to maximize returns per quota unit. The price data is for two vessel types: fixed-
gear (not subject to ITQs), which are more selective in their catches and tend to land
Table 2
Mean Output Quantities for the Scotia-Fundy Groundfishery
Output Vessels Less Than 45’ Vessels Between 45–65’
1988 1991 1988 1991
Cod catch 75,652.60 61,550.08 177,756.70 169,561.70
(84,074.00) (57,894.53) (148,166.10) (171,257.60)
Haddock catch 34,225.77 17,330.50 77,253.60 40,500.92
(42,934.16) (21,618.34) (70,091.02) (28,673.37)
Pollock catch 25,609.21 13,189.71 62,794.05 67,046.42
(39,932.74) (22,218.72) (51,220.02) (44,995.05)
Flounder catch 45,858.81 37,445.13 35,393.65 34,843.69
(37,706.41) (41,471.51) (47,837.94) (40,121.34)
Redfish catch 2,683.88 15,530.42 19,349.75 7,082.86
(4,409.32) (49,133.63) (36,381.83) (20,141.33)
Mollusc catch 0.00 696.38 6.30 3,460.50
Total groundfish catch 192,201.00 148,330.90 389,045.20 323,400.60
(135,133.80) (117,912.40) (169,854.80) (185,343.20)
Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations for the variables.
Table 3
Mean Output Prices for the Scotia-Fundy Groundfishery
Output Vessels Less Than 45’ Vessels Between 45–65’
1988 1991 1988 1991
Cod price 0.78 1.13 0.72 1.14
(0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.26)
Haddock price 1.16 1.48 1.20 1.56
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.29)
Pollock price 0.36 0.67 0.36 0.71
(0.11) (0.15) (0.06) (0.13)
Flounder price 1.22 1.16 1.16 1.25
(0.41) (0.31) (0.33) (0.35)
Redfish price 0.48 0.40 0.47 0.48
(0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18)
Mollusc price 0.00 3.08 1.97 1.42
Average groundfish price 0.95 1.09 0.79 1.10
(0.24) (0.27) (0.18) (0.21)
Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations for the variables.
11 Herrmann (1996) has also compared the price changes due to ITQs for the British Columbia halibut fishery.Dupont and Grafton 214
Figure 4. Average Real Cod Prices—Fixed Gear and Mobile Gear Groundfish Fleets
(Source: DFO Catch Statistics)
Figure 5. Average Real Haddock Prices—Fixed Gear and Mobile Gear Groundfish
(Source: DFO Catch Statistics)Multi-species Fisheries and ITQs 215
high-quality fish, and mobile-gear, near-shore vessels (subject to ITQs since 1991),
which are less able to target individual species and tend to land lower-quality fish.
For each of the three quota species (cod, haddock, and pollock), fleet average real
prices for the fixed gear and mobile gear fishers are available for the period 1981 to
1995 and are presented in figures 4, 5, and 6. In each case, the solid black line rep-
resents the real price series of fish caught by fixed gear, while the dashed line repre-
sents the real price series of fish caught by mobile gear. These figures show that av-
erage real prices for cod, haddock, and pollock caught with mobile gear (with the
exception of the period 1981–83) were equal to or lower than that of fish caught by
fixed gear over the period 1981 to 1992.
Since the introduction of ITQs, and particularly since 1993, it appears that the
average real prices for fish caught by mobile gear have risen to be equal to or
greater than those paid for fish caught by fixed gear. In order to examine whether
ITQs have led to an increase in prices in the ITQ fishery relative to the non-ITQ
fishery, a new variable was calculated for each of the three ITQ species. This vari-
able was defined to be the difference between the mobile gear (ITQ fleet) and fixed
gear (non-ITQ) price for a given species. The mean values for each of these new
variables were calculated for two periods: pre-ITQ (1981–90) and post-ITQ (1991–
95). A series of independent t-tests for equivalence of means shows that the mean
price difference for haddock was significantly different in the two periods.12 More-
 Figure 6. Average Real Pollock Prices—Fixed Gear and
Mobile Gear Groundfish Fleets
(Source: DFO Catch Statistics)
12 The mean difference for the price of haddock (mobile gear minus fixed gear price) for the pre-ITQ
period was –8.05E-02, while the mean difference for the post-ITQ period was 2.45E+02. The mean dif-
ferences for the two periods for cod were –3.47E-02 and –2.46E-02. Finally, the mean differences for
the two periods for pollock were -5.79E-02 and –4.61E-02. The t-test for equality of means for haddock
was –3.513, while for cod it was –0.286, and for pollock it was –0.360.Dupont and Grafton 216
over, the price difference went from being negative (fixed gear price was higher
than mobile gear) to positive (mobile gear price higher). In the case of the other two
species, the mean price differences were not significantly different over the two pe-
riods. They remained negative for both periods, but became less negative in the
post-ITQ period. The latter suggests that the price differential between the mobile
gear and fixed gear fleets may be closing as a result of the introduction of ITQs for
mobile gear fishers.
These data provide some evidence, albeit weak, that ITQs may have changed
the incentives faced by fishers, and thus enabled them to land a higher-quality and
higher-priced product. Supporting evidence for this interpretation is the fact that the
pattern of fishing has changed since ITQs were introduced into the fishery. In par-
ticular, more fish are being caught towards the end of the fishing season than was
the case prior to 1991 (Barbara, Brander, and Liew 1995). It should be noted that
both fixed and mobile gear vessels are subject to the same reductions in biomass
that occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s. Thus, increases in output prices for mo-
bile gear (ITQ) vessels relative to fixed gear (non-ITQ) vessels from 1993 onwards
cannot be attributed to lower stock levels.
Exit of Vessels
A widely cited economic benefit of ITQs is their ability to enable fishers to exit vol-
untarily from a fishery by selling their license and quota.13 Since the introduction of
the ITQ program, substantial changes have occurred at the aggregate level regarding
the size of the mobile gear groundfish fleet. At the end of the first year of the quota
program in 1991, 321 vessels had licenses with quota shares allowing them to catch
fish to some specified limit. (However, the potential number of quota holders was
equal to 449.) At the end of 1998, only 249 licenses continued to hold permanent
quota shares.14 In addition, the number of active ITQ vessels fell steadily from 268
in 1991 to 137 in 1998.15 This was facilitated by the provisions that permitted mul-
tiple quota licenses being fished by a single vessel through the transfer of temporary
quota.
A key benefit to regulators of ITQs is that the costs of voluntary exit of vessels
are borne by those fishers who purchase the available quotas and licenses. By con-
trast, traditional license buybacks and regulatory approaches to reducing capacity
are both expensive and are often ineffective.16 Moreover, by encouraging voluntary
exit from the fishery, ITQs may also reduce latent fishing effort which could be ap-
plied should East Coast groundfish stocks recover.
13 A model of the exit decisions by fishers in an ITQ fishery is provided by Weninger and Just (1997).
14 Personal communication, Cindy Webster, Commercial Data Division, Fisheries and Oceans, Halifax,
February 25, 1999.
15 This is all the more remarkable when one considers the activities of the generalist fleet. This is largely
composed of fishers primarily seeking flounder, but with bycatch of haddock and cod. When the ITQ
program was initiated, 50 of these fishers chose to pool their individual allocations of quota for cod and
haddock and fish them competitively. Each year, these fishers are allowed to leave the generalist fleet
until mid-April and become part of the regular ITQ fleet. By 1998, only 28 of the original 50 generalists
remained. The other 22 chose to return to the ITQ fleet. Thus, the 137 active ITQ vessels in 1998 in-
cludes the previously generalist fishers.
16 Adjustment costs in assisting East Coast inshore groundfish fishers and fish processing workers since
the collapse of the groundfish stock have, to date, cost over $3 billion; yet thousands of fishers still re-
main willing and able to begin fishing should stocks recover (Grafton and Lane 1998).Multi-species Fisheries and ITQs 217
Insights for Fisheries Management
The experiences gained from the Scotia-Fundy groundfishery provide some insights
for fisheries managers interested in applying multi-species ITQs. These issues are
examined with respect to a number of criteria including data collection, characteris-
tics of the harvesting rights, and the proliferation of harvesting rights.
Data Issues
A key to well-managed fisheries is to have clearly defined objectives, strategies, and
tactics to achieve the specified goals. Without performance criteria to measure
whether objectives have been achieved, or whether strategies or tactics have been
successful, managers will not know whether their policies are effective or not. In
terms of ITQ management, a common objective is that private harvesting rights in-
crease economic efficiency and help overcome overcapacity.
In the Scotia-Fundy ITQ mobile gear fishery, costs and earnings data were col-
lected from a sample of fishers in 1988 and 1991, before and after the introduction
of private harvesting rights. Unfortunately, these data were collected neither system-
atically nor on a panel basis, and, thus, regulators were unable to measure annual
changes in efficiency and individual vessel capacity over time. Moreover, the lack
of economic data to quantitatively evaluate the successes and failures of ITQs is
common to many fisheries. For example, despite being a world leader in the use of
ITQs, New Zealand does not collect individual costs and earnings data in order to be
able to effectively measure economic performance criteria in its fisheries. Ensuring
such data are collected and available for analysis should be a high priority in the
Scotia-Fundy mobile gear fishery, or any other ITQ fishery, and especially for multi-
species fisheries where incomplete quota coverage exists over the species caught by
fishers.
Characteristics of Harvesting Rights
The history of ITQ regulations in the fishery suggests that the regulator must take an
active role in adapting regulations to suit the particular needs of the fishery. For ex-
ample, initially fishers were allowed to exchange excess catches of one species for
another at a predetermined rate. Unfortunately, this has encouraged the landings of
species for which fishers did not have quota, and was subsequently dropped (Bar-
bara, Brander and Liew 1995).
Recently, the regulator has increased the flexibility of fishers in reconciling
their quota with their landings. Such changes should reduce transactions costs and
mitigate the constraints on fishers. Nevertheless, limits still remain in the fishery,
restricting the transferability of quotas and, thus, the potential for improvements in
economic efficiency. For example, the regulator maintains a maximum quota limit
of 2% of the TAC, a moratorium on the transfer of vessel licenses to fish processors
and, until recently, a prohibition on the pooling of quotas by fishers with multiple
vessels. These regulations attenuate the transferability and divisibility of the prop-
erty right.17
The experience of ITQ management in the fishery also stresses the importance
17 See Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000) for a detailed analysis of the implications of the potential effects
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of ensuring the quota is viewed as a permanent and durable property right. In the
1993 season, concerns over the size of the stock led DFO to stop all fishing halfway
through the season. As a result, some ITQ fishers were unable to catch their quota
for that season which, in turn, undermined the security attached to the property
right. In turn, this may have affected the incentives of fishers with ITQs to spread
their catch over the entire fishing season. Ongoing concerns also exist about high-
grading at sea (Barbara, Brander and Liew 1995) which may limit the perceived ex-
clusivity of ITQs by fishers. These, and other problems in the fishery, should be ad-
dressed as part of an overall approach that involves adaptive management and active
cooperation between fishers and DFO.
Implications for Multiple Species Fisheries
ITQs have traditionally been defined for individual species, and the Nova Scotia ex-
perience conforms to that tradition. However, an examination of events post-ITQ in
the Scotia-Fundy fishery reveals potential problems with this approach in an inher-
ently multi-species fishery. If quotas were imposed upon a subset of species within a
multi-species fishery, then theory would suggest that reductions in overall TACs for
ITQ fisheries might lead to increased pressure upon non-ITQ stocks. In time, regula-
tors might feel the need to make these previously non-ITQ species subject to quotas
as well. This proliferation of quotas may increase the difficulty of administration
and monitoring to the public sector, thereby reducing some of the positive aspects of
ITQ management.
In the Scotia-Fundy fishery, drastic cuts in the TACs of ITQ species during the
early years of the ITQ program—cuts that were necessitated by the large declines in
the biomass—encouraged fishers turned to target other species, such as flounder and
redfish. Fishing pressure upon these stocks subsequently led to an extension of the
ITQ program over additional species. At the same time, DFO has been successful in
passing many of the surveillance costs—including the costs of at-sea and dockside
observers—onto the fishers who benefit from the ITQ program.
Concluding Remarks
In 1991, ITQs were introduced into the Nova Scotia inshore mobile gear fleet. From
the original 455 license holders, 325 chose to fish that first year in the ITQ fishery,
while 50 chose to pool their quota and to continue to fish competitively. Costs and
earnings data from a sample of fishers, before and after the introduction of ITQs,
suggest no significant change in the average use of inputs by fishers in the first year
ITQs were implemented. Some changes, however, in the variability of the input
measures across the fleet were observed, suggesting a possible differential response
to ITQs depending on vessel size.
A comparison of price series for fish between fixed-gear vessels not governed
by ITQs and vessels managed by ITQs, suggests that rights-based management,
since 1993, has encouraged fishers to better allocate their catches over the fishing
season and increased the quality and price for their product. In addition to these
gains, ITQs have also assisted fishers to voluntarily exit from the fishery such that
the number of active ITQ vessels halved over the period 1991–98. In an industry
characterized by overcapacity and historically low fish biomass, adjustments that re-
duce the latent fishing effort are desirable. Moreover, in 1994, the majority of re-
sponding fishers elected to make the quotas permanent and to endorse the permanentMulti-species Fisheries and ITQs 219
transfers of quotas (Barbara, Brander and Liew 1995). This support for ITQs oc-
curred despite the fact fishers themselves pay for the costs of dockside monitoring
and the use of at-sea observers required by DFO.
Despite the apparent support for ITQs by fishers, a reduction in the number of
vessels in the fishery, and apparent price increases for ITQ-caught fish, the study
suggests that regulators need to do far more than specify private harvesting rights to
achieve the full benefits of rights-based management. To evaluate whether objec-
tives (such as improvements in economic efficiency) have been achieved, individual
vessel costs and earnings data must be collected on a systematic basis. Further, man-
agement should adapt to the needs of the particular circumstances of the fishery, in-
volve fishers in the decision-making process, and be cognizant of the implications
of quota programs on non-ITQ species. Finally, considerable care should be exer-
cised in placing limits on the characteristics of the property right and, in particular,
limits on transferability, duration, and divisibility.
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